THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE STATE IN THE HAMIDIAN PERIOD;
IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES (1876- 1908)

After the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78 and the consequent loss of most of the Balkan Christian provinces, the official nationalism of the Porte became more Islamic in flavour and style. Abdulhamid 11, a convinced autocrat and a ruler who had no time for experimentation with democracy, recast the myth symbol complex of his state in a different mould. Where the Tanzimat had stressed the equality of all subjects, Abdulhamid realigned the basis of the state on a more Islamic foundation. However, here one has to be careful. The Islamism of Abdulhamid was in many ways a new creation. Although the motifs and the style of state ideology were Islamic, much of his policy stemmed from secular considerations aimed at the secular ends of retrenchment and last-ditch defence. Nor did the sultan attempt to turn the clock back.
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He continued many of the dominant trends of the Tanzimat period, most noticeably the emphasis on centralization and the spread of education. The underlying motive force behind all these considerations was that the Ottoman Empire felt threatened both morally and physically. The Sublime State saw that it was constantly losing manoeuvring space in a ever-shrinking world. Just as it was attempting to improve its public image both towards its own subjects and towards the outside world, the challenges mounted. Perhaps he realized very early that there was an organic link between nineteenth century imperialism and missionary zeal. Everywhere the missionary appeared as the representative of a superior civilization and culture, the primary vehicle for the realization of the White Man's Burden. Not only did the missionaries undermine the efforts the Ottomans were making to legitimize the basis of their rule at home, but they also proved influential in creating adverse conditions for the Ottomans abroad by feeding the Western press with anti-Ottoman sentiment: "Many missionaries and western journalists proceeded upon the confident assumption that the Terrible Turk belonged to a retrograde race of Devil worshipper. Particularly in the reign of Abdulhamid 11, missionary activity picked up momentum during the 1880s and 1890s, with British, French, Russian, and American missionaries parcelling out spheres of activity within the empire. This led to a situation where, as Jeremy Salt argues, "the relationship that developed between the missionaries and the Ottoman government was one of mutual suspicion and mutual dislike." Indeed, by the 1880s the Sultan came to regard the missionaries as "the most dangerous enemies to the social order" among all the foreigners living in his domains. Diplomats, merchants, soldiers, all had to do with the here and now; the missionaries, through their schools, had to do with the future. In this respect the missionary issue, far too complicated to be dealt with exhaustively in this study, forms one of the key issues for understanding what was becoming increasingly an Ottoman obsession with their public image. There is ample evidence, in the Ottoman archival sources, that the Ottoman ruling elite feared infiltration, not only of its Christian minorities but also of its Muslim population, as well as other marginal groups, such as the Nusayris and the Yezidi Kurds. Moreover, it was precisely these marginal elements which were coming to the fore as the state felt that it had to squeeze the last sources for untapped manpower.

The Ottoman response was a desperate attempt at social engineering which found its main expression in an effort to shore up the Sunni Hanefi mezheb (sect) as the basis of official religiosity, as the official belief (mezheb-i resmiye). This policy furnished a good example of what Smith calls "the process of turning a largely aristocratic and lateral ethnie and former polity into a full political nation . . . [through] a conscious programme of mass education and propaganda." Although the Hanefi school of jurisprudence had always enjoyed official endorsement in the Ottoman Empire, strict imposition of orthodoxy was not stressed in the more cosmopolitan atmosphere of earlier periods. This new emphasis on orthodoxy, one sphere in which the Ottomans had recourse to invented traditions, was a good example of "adaptation [taking] place for old uses in new conditions and by using old models for new purpose. In furthering this aim, the Sublime State embarked on a hitherto unprecedented programme of what can only be called counter-propaganda. This effort involved the active encouragement of conversion to the Hanefi sect, and for the first time, the Ottomans envisioned using missionary zeal to fight missionary zeal. The focus of most missionary activity was Eastern Anatolia and the Arab provinces (Vilayet). Particularly Syria and the notoriously heterodox Iraqi vilayets of Basra, Mosul, and Bagdad saw increased activity in the 1890s. The increase in British influence in Iran in the last quarter of the nineteenth century paralleled the increase of Protestant (American and British) activity in the frontier zone between the Ottoman heartlands and Iran. One example among others, an Imperial Decree (Irade) dated 26 January 1892, stated that "English priests" had been seen in the vicinity of Kevar, on the Ottoman-Iranian border. These priests, it was reported, were distributing books and pamphlets among the local Nestorian population. One had been apprehended, and an investigation had been launched. The sultan decreed that they be "chased away in the firmest manner" (suret-i hakimanede oralardan def 'leri).These Imperial decrees are particularly interesting because they highlight the fact that the sultan had a fairly clear notion of the ambivalent relationship between the Bible Societies and the Western governments. This is illustrated in the lines that he dictated to his private secretary:

In England, Russia and France there exist Bible Societies which become exceedingly rich through the donations of wealthy and fanatical Christians who bequeath all their wealth to them in their wills . . . although the English, Russian, and French governments seem not to be directly involved in their activities, they secretly aid and abet them in sending missionaries even into darkest Africa. In this way they spread their beliefs among the local population. By increasing the numbers of their followers this religious influence is then transformed into political leverage. . . . Recently they have been reported in Mosul, and their books and pamphlets have even appeared in Istanbul. Although it is obviously desirable to take firm measures against them, if open opposition is brought to bear, the Sublime Porte will suffer the vexing intervention of the three powers' ambassadors. Thus, the only way to fight against them is to increase the Islamic population and spread the belief in the Holiest of Faiths.

Given that such concern was evinced at the highest level, it is not surprising to find numerous instances in the Ottoman records of local officials in the field reacting to missionary subversion. One method of dealing with the problem was a systematic programme of conversion to Sunni Hanefi orthodoxy, which was applied particularly among the marginal elements, such as the Shi'ites, the Nusayri, and the Yezidi Kurds. In one such instance, Muhammed Hassa, the Mutasarrff of Lazkiye (Latakia) in Syria, wrote to Istanbul on 26 June 1890, to report that the Nusayri of Sahyun district had expressed a collective desire to be converted to the Hanefi mezheb. This event had been preceded by the conversion of the Nusayris of Markab and Cebele in the same region. The Nusayri leaders of Sahyun, the official reported, had signed a petition requesting that the state provide them with schools and mosques (mescids) and teachers to instruct them in the Hanefi belief. Fifteen schools and ten mescid were needed for the district of Sahyun. The matter was one of utmost urgency because missionaries were active among the Nusayri population:

If the Sublime State finds itself unable to make the necessary sacrifices in terms of resources to grant the requests of these people, and abandons them to their forlorn state of ignorance, this can only have grievous consequences. This will only butter the bread of the foreigners who have already gone so far as to pay regular salaries to the Nusayri leaders. [If their request is not granted] the foreigners will be able to tell them, 'see, your government is unable to take care of you' and this will lead to an increase of their already present influence.

The Vali of Beirut added to this report on 27 June 1890 that the schools and mosques had to be complemented by barracks for Imperial regulars which would be stationed in Sahyun. The official confidently stated that "if this is done the intrigues of the Christian priests will be countered." The classic triangle for inculcating and maintaining orthodoxy-the school, mosque, and barracks-was thus established. The Vilayet of Syria continued to report intense missionary activity. The Vali of the province, Osman Nuri Pasha, wrote to Istanbul on 21 January 1892 that in keeping with the orders emanating from the capital, he had compiled a list of unlicensed, newly constituted churches and schools. He estimated that there were 159 of these schools, which "had been constructed in an underhand manner" by converting dwellings into schoolhouses. The Jesuits and Protestants had been very active to the point of subsidizing the families of the students:

According to my investigations, the Jesuits and Protestants not only admit non-Muslim children into their schools free of charge and pay for their food and clothing, but also pay subsidies to their parents. This has a very detrimental effect on the simple folk who cannot tell good from evil. The continuation of this state of affairs can only have very serious consequences in the future.

The implication was, however, that the activity of the missionaries was also having its effect on the Muslim population. Osman Nuri Pasha suggested that in order for these latter to be preserved from the "intrigues and subversion" of the "priests," and as the holy month of Ramadan was approaching, specially appointed 'ulama should be sent to the areas in question. These teachers were to "secretly impart to the Muslim population the ills that will accrue to them if they sent their children to Christian schools." The appropriate Irade was in fact issued on 1 March 1892 determining that seven local 'ulama should be assigned to the districts in question. The interesting aspect of this communication was its emphasis on secrecy. It is fairly clear that any opposition to the missionaries which was too blatant would draw the wrath of the Powers' consuls.

The Ottomans were clearly aware that the extreme constraints on their resources were creating a vacuum in the educational services being filled by the missionary schools. An Imperial decree dated 26 June 1892 ordered that Muslim children should be removed from all non-Muslim schools and educated by village imams. Yet the same document openly stated that Ýstanbul could not send any more money to Syria, even though only a fairly modest sum was needed to print reading primers for primary schools. As can be seen from the above, education was perceived as a defensive weapon against what was emerging as an insidious threat to the integrity of the empire. Forced to squeeze his empire for its last reserves of manpower, Abdiilhamid I1 cast about for untapped resources. One such possible source were the Yezidi Kurds, a war-like mountain people who inhabited the Seyhan area in the vastness of northern Iraq. A "heretical sect," as far as Suni orthodoxy was concerned, the Yezidi Kurds could be turned to account through "Hanefization." As put by John Guest, "the Yezidis-Kurds but not Muslims . . . represented an anomaly in the mind of the pious Sultan." Thus, from 1885 onwards, they were put on conscription lists and required to perform military service. A memorandum prepared by Grand Vizier Cevad Pasha, dated 25 October 1891 and summarizing the deliberations of the Ottoman Council of Ministers on the matter, dwelled at length on this issue. In order to "correct the ignorance and heresy of these people," the Porte had ordered an advisory commission to Mosul to bring the Yezidis into line, so that they would be useful for military service. The mission had only further alienated the Yezidis by inordinately violent measures, "thus further increasing their fanaticism and bigotry." Cevad Pasha suggested that the mission be recalled and replaced by competent persons who would be informed about the "peculiarities of the sect" and use persuasion and education rather than force. The Irade endorsing the Minister's suggestions, issued some ten days previously, stated that 13,000 kurug had already been spent on a mosque and an endowment for those Yezidis who had "already converted to the True Faith. "This pressure from the central government caused the Yezidis to turn to the American missionaries active among them after the late 1880s, particularly the American Board mission in Mardin, which had made expeditionary approaches to the Yezidis after receiving support from an "unnamed English Lady [who] sent a small sum for a tentative effort among them."

In the summer of 1892, the Ottoman government mounted its most concentrated campaign of conversion among the Yezidis. A strong-willed general, 0mer Vehbi Pasha, was given the title, Commander of the Forces of Reform (Firka-i Islahiye Kumandanz), and was sent to Mosul to deal with the problem. Using quite brutal methods and systematic repression, he succeeded in forcing the conversion of some Yezidis to Hanefi Islam. On 20 August 1892, 0mer Vehbi P asha sent Istanbul a detailed telegram giving a colourful account of his success:


After repeated unsuccessful attempts through the centuries to bring them back to the true path, eighty villages of the Yezidis and thirty villages of the Shi'a have acceded to the honour of the True Faith. Yesterday their leaders, with total freedom of conscience, accepted my invitation to come to Mosul and become Muslim. This morning, as the military band played the Hamidiye march, and ranks upon ranks of the ulema intoned the holiest of prayers proclaiming the One True God, a great crowd of notables and military personnel gathered around the municipality offices. As a guard of honour stood to military salute, the Muftu asked each one if he accepted Islam of his own free will. Upon each confirmation the crowd shouted, 'Long Live the Sultan!' (Padiþahým Çok Yaþa).Of course, the degree of consensus involved here has to be treated very superiors would like to hear. The aspect of invented tradition is striking in the elaborate ceremonial, the guard of honour, the Hamidiye march played by the military band, and the acclamation wishing long life to the Sultan. Another reference to mass conversion occurred in the northern Iraqi village of Alkush. The Vilayet of Mosul reported on 5 February 1903 that an instance of forcible conversion occurred in the village when a certain sheikh, Muhammad Nur, forcibly drove some of the Christians into Mosul and there effected their forcible conversion. When the story got out, it led to an uprising by the local population, which protested that "the proper procedure had not been carried out" by the Vali and the religious officials. The proper procedure required that a priest attend the proceedings to strike the Christians off his lists. Because no such priest was present, the population felt that the conversions were not valid. The affair provoked a major riot, and the Vali reported he feared for his life.

A third reference to conversion in a slightly more sensational vein occurred in the town of Savugbulak on the Iranian border. This incident appears in the Ottoman records on 2 October 1891, when an English girl, a "Miss Kranfel" was "abducted" by a Kurd and was reported to have converted to Islam. The matter was made no simpler by the girl's assertion that she had voluntarily espoused Islam and that she had no regrets about having done so. The couple had taken refuge with the Ottoman Consul in Savugbulak, an Armenian named Toma Efendi. The matter caused no end of complications after the girl's family, the British government, the Iranian government, as well as the local population became involved. Although the documentary evidence is incomplete and fragmented, the matter was clearly much more of an embarrassment rather than a religious triumph. In all the cases mentioned above, the emphasis is on conversion according to "proper channels" and a positive discouragement of conversion through arbitrary, irregular, or accidental occurrences. The new emphasis on Hanefi orthodoxy also ran counter to the official line of the Tanzimat Edict, which declared that all religions in the empire were equal. A document dated 4 November 1891 refers to a petition sent by ten signatories from Antakya (Antioch), who complained bitterly that although they wanted to become Muslim, the officials in Antioch had "denied them this blessing." The decree issuing on this information ordered that "because there is freedom of religion" (edyan serbest oldugundan), an inquiry should be launched to discover what confession the petitioners belonged to and all procedures relating to them should conform to long-prevailing practices (usul) and regulation. When the Western powers criticized the efforts to prevent proselytizing, the Ottoman officials answered that all religions were equal and everyone had the right to believe what they wanted, but this also meant that they had the right to protect their religion.' The other remarkable feature of this period is the growing awareness among the ruling circles that new methods were needed to suit this new orthodoxy. A striking example of this new mentality can be observed in a memorandum of 8 April 1892 written by Suleyman Husnu Pasha, a leading figure in the deposition of Sultan Abdulaziz in 1876. In this extremely long and detailed piece, Suleyman Husnu Pasha, exiled as Governor to Bagdad, wrote the sultan, to propose measures for countering both Islamic heresy and Christian missionary activity. The report stressed that those adhering to the "official religion of the state" were actually a minority in the provinces of Bagdad, Mosul, and Basra. Shi'ism was singled out as the greatest danger, but his report also dealt with other rival "heretical sects" , in which he included Nestorians, Chaldeans, Armenian Catholics and Protestants, and Jews. The surest method of dealing with the problem, said Suleyman Pasha, was for the state to sponsor the writing of a "Book of Beliefs" (Kitab-ul Akaid). This learned work would be a compilation of the writings of famous Islamic scholars and would consist of fifteen chapters, each refuting one or another of the fractious beliefs. He gave specific references to scholars of good repute, "such as the work of the Indian alim, Rahmetullah Efendi called Izhar ul Hak which is a very convincing rebuttal of the Christian and Jewish faiths." The most remarkable element in the Pasha's report was the suggestion that the book be used to train specially selected 'ulama who after two or three years training would be given the title, Dai-ul-Hak-Misyoner. Thus would be created a Missionary Society (Dailer Cemiyeti), which would fight missionary zeal with missionary zeal. Therefore, although orthodox Islam does not involve active proselytizing in the Christian sense of "saving souls," what Siuleyman Husny Pasha was proposing here was the institution of a neo-tradition in combating what he saw as subversive activity. Active proselytizing did become a regular feature, particularly in the heavily Shi'ite provinces of Iraq. The Ottoman archives abound with there to fight heresy, and other official correspondence dealing with this aspect of Ottoman counter-propaganda. Although the Ottoman state faced what it regarded as subversive insurgency at home, it also took care to reaffirm that it was a great power among others, a state of affairs which the other great powers were obliged to recognize, if only by courtesy. A case in point was the effort made to formalize relations with the Papacy. On 30 March 1898 the Ottoman State decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican for the first time. An Imperial decree which followed some three weeks later determined that Asim Bey, former Ambassador to Athens, would be appointed as the first ambassador to the Holy See "because other states have sent ambassadors to the Papacy and the request from His Holiness the Pope that His Imperial Majesty should follow suit."
The decree further stated that establishing such a post was necessary "in order to deal directly in matters pertaining to the affairs of Catholics who are Ottoman subjects." Clearly, it was hoped that by dealing with the papacy directly, some measure of control would be established over the activities of the Catholic missionaries. One might also surmise that the sultan, as the Caliph of all Muslims, wanted to reaffirm his position by recognizing his opposite number.


SELÝM DERÝNGÝL...







Source:
http://www.brynmawr.edu/provost/biblio/Deringil.pdf