Ottomanism and Zionism During the Second Constitutional Period 1908-1915

From several important perspectives the position of Ottoman Jewry presented a unique case in the social and political history of the late Ottoman Empire. When the Second Constitutional Period was inaugurated in 1908, the socio-political situation of the Jewish community was similar, in some respects, to that of the Muslim Turks. Within the community there were some who actively supported the constitutional government, whereas others were staunch sympathizers of the fallen Hamidian regime. This duality was apparent on the highest leadership and administrative levels of the community. The most significant and widely known incident reflecting this duality was the resignation of the Acting Chief Rabbi Mosheh Levi (Halevi) following the Young Turk Revolution. It appeared as if the old leadership had opted to relinquish its power to the party supporting the Young Turks, without provoking any kind of incident.

The general situation of Ottoman Jewry during the Second Constitutional Period may be summarized as follows: geographically, the Jews were the most widely spread group in the empire. They lived throughout most of the Arab provinces and in Anatolia. Their presence was particularly noticeable in Izmir and in almost every other urban center in western Anatolia. In the European provinces, in addition to the important cities of Istanbul, Salonica, Edirne, and Gelibolu, Jewish communities were found in the urban centers of Bosnia, southern Bulgaria, and Macedonia. Ottoman Jewry was also the most culturally diverse ethnic group. In the European and Anatolian provinces, the Judeo-Spanish speaking Sephardim predominated. However, with the increased recent immigration of East European Jews, primarily from Russia and Romania, Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazi groups became increasingly noticeable. In addition, in the large port cities of Istanbul, Izmir, and Salonica there existed congregations of Italian Jews. Elsewhere in the empire, there were Jews who spoke Arabic, Kurdish and even Aramaic. Indeed, there was no other ethnic element as polyglot as the Jews. These two factors, great physical dispersion and cultural and linguistic diversity, could not become easily conducive to the emergence of a national Jewish movement, as in the case of other ethnic groups.

It is possible to state that Turks and Jews were two groups within the empire that were among the least exposed to nationalism. Ottoman Jewry became exposed to European culture only in the second half of the nineteenth century, later than any other non-Muslim minority. For this reason, it was slow to accept nationalism as an abstract notion to be applied in practice. On the other hand, the Balkan nations, and especially the Christian elements, had been influenced by, and had supported, each other in their national aspirations since the end of the eighteenth century. The Greek rebellion owed much to the Serbian; Bulgarian nationalism owed much to the Greek Hetairia; and the role played by Bulgarian volunteers in the Greek rebellion is well known. However, it was not possible for the Ottoman Jews, who reined outside the pale of Christian brotherhood and who generally were in economic competition with the Christian elements of the empire, to feel an interest in, and sympathy for, these movements. In short, at the end of the empire, the objective conditions that would draw Ottoman Jewry to the intellectual currents of contemporary nationalism appear to have been absent. It would seem that Ottomanism-that is, a modern political theory advocating Ottoman patriotism, which was a product of the nineteenth century-held great promise for Jewish needs and aspirations.

Ottoman Jewry entered the modernization period under the guidance of Western Jewish educational and charitable organizations, whose primary concern was to prepare young Jews to become useful and productive members of the general society in which they lived. The most active organizations in the Ottoman Empire were the Alliance Israelite Universelle (established in 1860) and the Hilfsverein der DeutschenJuden (founded in 1901). The ideology of these organizations was primarily assimilationist and antinationalist, although by their structure and curricula they made it easier for young Jews trained in their institutions to assimilate into Western, rather than Ottoman, society. There were, however, significant numbers of young Jews, especially among the lower classes, who for economic reasons attended Ottoman secondary schools, where a liberal system of financial aid was in existence. A significant number of those later went on to study in Ottoman institutions of higher learning, such as the Faculty of Law and the Medical School. This, in turn, led to the emergence of an Ottomanized Jewish element within the Jewish elite and also within the Ottoman bureaucratic elite. Although no Jew ever attained the office of minister, ambassador, or governor, the number of Jews in the upper levels of the various ministries, and in particular in the financial and medical administration, became significant toward the end of the empire.

In addition, there was a growing number of Jewish intellectuals who were truly bilingual (as was the case with other ethnic minorities of the empire), speaking Turkish as one of their native tongues. Indeed, by that time Turkish-language instruction had been incorporated into all Jewish schools, which also added courses on Turkish history and geography. Several Jews began to assume a role in Turkish journalism. In Izmir, Moise Fresco published Ustad, a Turkish newspaper written in Hebrew characters. Nissim Masllyah published the newspaper Ittihad, and Moise Cohen published the Iktisadiyat Mecmuasi from 1915 to 1918. Avram Galante (Galante), who had attained prominence during this period, was also a member of this bilingual group.

Finally, there were Jewish political activists who supported the constitutional movement and who had been in contact with the Unionists since the days of Abdulhamid II. This group overlapped to some extent with the previous one and included Nissim Masliyah, Albert Ferid Asseo, Albert Fua, of the Mesveret newspaper group in Paris, the famous Emmanuel Carasso, Nissim Russo, and Avram Galante. Galante had been a member of the Misir Cemiyet-i Israiliyesi (the Jewish Society of Egypt), which had been in contact with the Young Turk leader Ahmed Riza and had supported him during the opposition years. These Ottomanized Jewish intellectuals were genuinely staunch supporters of the ideals of the Second Constitutional Period. Their support was not "tactical" and should not be regarded as a national "compromise," as was the case with the position of some of the intellectuals of the Balkan ethnic groups. It was rather a direct result of their Ottoman patriotism. Unlike the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Armenians who entered the elections with their own nationalist agendas, the Jewish delegates did not exhibit such tendencies. Moreover, unlike the Albanian and Arab delegates, they did not even establish their own national cultural clubs. In spite of this, in the parliaments of the Second Constitutional Period, the Jewish delegates were represented effectively due to their active support of, and participation within, the Committee of Union and Progress.

It should be added, however, that in spite of the lack of "objective" conditions for the rise of a Jewish nationalism, as described before, Esther Benbassa has demonstrated in another article in this volume that, as of 1908, Zionism became a considerable force within the Jewish community, especially at the grassroots level. Its success derived mainly from the growing politicization of the community, and it was able to draw adherents from the camps of its ideological adversaries, both the traditionalist religious groups and the assimilationist Alliancists. It should be pointed out, however, that Ottoman Zionists generally supported the principle of the state's territorial integrity and focused primarily on activities aimed at Jewish cultural revival. Their political activities were conducted almost exclusively within the internal level of the community, aiming at controlling, or at least influencing, the community leadership.

During the Second Constitutional Period, Ottoman Jewry was represented and governed by Chief Rabbi Haim Nahum, who personified a new type of Ottomanized Jewish intellectual. Nahum, a native of Manisa, had received in his childhood a traditional religious education. He then attended and graduated from a government high school in Izmir and continued to study law at the Faculty of Law in lstanbul. From 1893 to 1897, he studied at the rabbinical seminary in Paris, where he received his ordination as a rabbi. He also studied Semitic languages at the College de France. While in Paris, Nahum established a relationship with Young Turk leaders then in exile. It was this relationship that propelled him to the position of acting chief rabbi, in 1908, and then chief rabbi, in 1909. The following appointment decree dated 12 July, 1909, is noteworthy:

The Imperial Nsan states: I, the Sultan, give this Imperial Berat [diploma], in which the old provisions concerning the conferment of the Chief Rabbinate are mentioned, to Haim Nahum, leader of the Jewish community, who had been elected by the electorate organized in accordance with the regulation [of the Jewish nation], to the vacant position of the Chief Rabbinate of Istanbul and its dependencies, and whose office had been reported by the Ministry of Justice and Sects and confirmed by the Privy Council of Ministers, and I order that:

''The aforesaid Haim Nahum Efendi be the Chief Rabbi of the nation of the Jews of Istanbul and its dependencies, and the Rabbis and community chiefs and all the Jews, of high or low status in my well-protected territories, recognize him as their Chief Rabbi, to apply to him for their affairs within the responsibility of the Chief Rabbinate; let them act in cooperation and agreement with him, and not fail in obeying and submitting to him according to their religion and customs...."

The government yearbook of the same year (1327/1909) refers to Nahum as hahambasi and to the other chief rabbis of twenty-seven major urban centers as bashaham. The term "lstanbul ve tevabii hahambasisi" (chief rabbi of Istanbul and its dependencies) had been used since the office was first established in 1835 in the reign of Mahmud II. But chief rabbis of other important towns had also been known until then by the title of hahambasi, and the chief rabbi of Istanbul was regarded merely as first among equals. Technically there is no difference between the title hahambasi and bashaham. Both mean chief rabbi. Nevertheless the distinction now made between the hahambasi of Istanbul and the bashahams of all other cities was intended, no doubt, to further stress the primacy of the former over all other rabbis in the empire. Indeed, following his appointment as chief rabbi, Haim Nahum was referred to in semiofficial and official documents, and in the press, as: "The spiritual head of the Jewish nation of the well-protected Ottoman territories, Chief Rabbi, the exalted Haim Nahum Efendi:...." In other words, he was regarded as chief rabbi of the Ottoman Empire. This reflects two important tendencies on the part of the Unionists. First, it reveals their personal confidence in Haim Nahum. In addition, however, it represents an attempt to establish for Ottoman Jewry a more centralized administrative organization, something which ran counter to the grain of the Unionists' policies regarding other ethnic groups. It is, therefore, a reflection of the Unionists' confidence in the political loyalties of Ottoman Jewry as a whole. Haim Nabum was awarded the highest Mecidiye order and was held in high esteem in official circles. As a matter of fact, it was his influential position that made him a favourite target of other non-Muslim groups within the empire.

Zionism, although a national movement, was perceived by Ottoman Turkish intellectuals and officials as something different. In the Ottoman mind, the familiar forms of separatist nationalism were those of the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians and the ethnic groups in Macedonia, with their underground committees and armed struggle. Due to this, the activities of the Zionist movement, invariably conducted in diplomatic, political, and economic terms, did not elicit significant reaction, contrary to what is generally believed. Some Ottomans even viewed Zionism with sympathy as a reaction against European domination and Christian culture. This is how, for example, Dr. Lichtheim, the Zionist representative in Istanbul, had correctly assessed the attitude of Ahmed Agaoglu, who was sympathetic toward the Zionist cause. It is true that among Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals there were some who had been affected directly or indirectly by European anti-Semitism. In general, however, it would appear that educated Ottomans did not have a prejudiced attitude vis-à-vis Judaism or Zionism. The policies of the provincial and central Ottoman authorities toward the Zionist settlers have not been studied in adequate depth to render an accurate picture. The few examples that emerge make it impossible to categorically state the position of any official body or forum on the subject of Ottoman policy toward Zionism. Nevertheless, the preliminary general impression is that policies and administrative strategies were neutral vis-à-vis Zionism. This may be due to the basic fact that during the last ten years of the empire, Zionism had simply not been in a position to aspire to more than some limited administrative and cultural autonomy, as opposed to an independent or even autonomous state within defined boundaries. Hence it did not pose a real threat to the state.

Finally, Ottoman administrators must have been impressed with Zionist support for Ottoman causes during the Tripoli War and the Balkan Wars. The efforts of Zionists to form a group that would join the Ottoman army to offer medical assistance during the Balkan Wars, and to mobilize volunteers to assist Ottoman units during the First World War, were also well known. Indeed, it became clear that on the eve of the World War and during its initial stages, Zionist groups viewed the continued existence of the Ottoman state as most desirable for their future plans in Palestine. The Zionist Organization even offered to make a contribution toward the construction of the Hijaz railroad. It appears that, for these reasons, some government circles were less annoyed by the Zionists than they were by some of the other minority groups who sought the protection and intervention of the Great Powers. In spite of all this, relations were too complex to be easily categorized.
It is often repeated that in 1907 the former governor of the district of Jerusalem, Ekrem Bey, convinced the minister of the interior of the necessity to prevent the immigration of Jews, particularly Russian Jews, whom he considered as a "dangerous element" for state security. His successor, Subhi Bey, however, followed an entirely different policy while stationed in Jerusalem and did not implement the recommended measures. This is one example demonstrating why Ottoman policy toward Zionism cannot be easily categorized.

Ottoman officials were, generally speaking, xenophobic on the subject of Zionism. Still they recognized the usefulness of the Zionist Organization and benefited by maintaining contacts with its representatives. Levontin reported to Herzl on 3 May, 1904: "The governor summoned me in haste and asked me to loan him 3,000 sterlings more, after he received a telegram from the Ministry of Finance." It appears that the governor had regularly received such loans from the Zionist leader when he was in need. Levontin adds: "This year's tax on sheep (resim-i agnam) will be good. I don't see any hindrance in providing this amount as well." What is interesting here is that these debtor-creditor relationships between Ottoman officials and the Zionist Organization, which were due to difficulties in the Ministry of Finance, have been represented in the literature on this subject as the fault of only the local officials' During the Second Constitutional Period, we see that various individuals, including Talat Pasha and other leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, observed and recognized that the Zionist colonies were a factor contributing to the development of Palestine and hence to the increase in tax revenues. On the other hand, however, it was this period that also witnessed a deterioration in Arab-Jewish relations and Ottoman attempts to curb the conflict. At this time, the Ottomans also made efforts to prevent the Zionists from obtaining land, fearing increased Great Power intervention. It was particularly for this last reason that Talat Pasha insisted that the Russian Jewish settlers become Ottoman citizens. On another issue, when the request of the Zionist Organization for cultural autonomy and participation in local government-which they expressed with the terms " offentlich-rechtlich" (publicly and by law)-was criticized in the Ottoman parliament as a move toward colonization and independence (particularly by Cosmidi Efendi, a Greek-Ottoman deputy), the Grand Vezir Hakki Pasha stated that preventive measures would be adopted against Zionist goals. Subsequently, Wolffsohn, one of the Zionist leaders, wrote a letter, dated 10 August, 1911, to Hakki Pasha, who was a jurist. He began by stating: "Your Highness does not need lengthy explanations to understand ... the term 'offentlich- rechtlich, ...." He nevertheless went on to explain that the term did not express a request for more than publicly recognized civil rights.

In the press, Ebuzziya Tevfik had adopted an anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist attitude. On the other hand, Ahmed Agaoglu and Esad were described by Jacobson, the Zionist representative in Istanbul, as "Friends of Zion." However, his successor, Lichtheim, who was less effusive in evaluating these matters, wrote that they appeared more prepared to support Jews and Zionists against the British and against other separatist national movements, rather than being true Friends of Zion. Dr. Abdullah Cevdet was a sympathizer of Judaism and the Zionist movement. Riza Tevfik, an opponent of the Unionists, was also sympathetic to Zionism. Ali Kemal, the editor of Iklam ve Peyam, which was considered an anti-Semitic publication, was apparently not so personally. He had opposed Zionism because it seemed to him that foreign powers were manipulating the movement. In fact, it was common knowledge in Istanbul during this period that the German embassy, which included several outspoken anti-Semites, among them Ambassador Wangenheim, supported Zionism solely with the expectation that it would advance German interests in Palestine. It was also obvious that Russia, the champion of official anti-Semitism at home, was not opposed to Jewish settlers in Palestine bearing Russian passports. For this reason, it appears that support of, or opposition to, Zionism did not reflect a particular political line. For the most part, government officials knew little or nothing about Zionism, which was a reflection of their general lack of interest in the movement. Arthur Ruppin, who was taken to court due to the anti-Zionist measures implemented by Cemal Pasha during the war years, recorded in his memoirs: "The Turkish officers who functioned as judges, did not have the slightest idea of Zionism, and things were not better with the civil judges who prepared the charges."

During the war, Cemal Pasha and his assistant Bahaddin had a hostile attitude toward the Zionist settlers. However, Cemal and Bahaddin followed the same rigid attitude toward the Arabs. This can be explained by a desire to ensure peace in a region not far from the front through the administration of strict measures, avoiding thereby conflicts between Arabs and Jews. Bekir Sami, the governor of Beirut, was a sympathizer of Zionism. In the capital, Talat, Cavid, and Haci Adil were leaders who had implemented policies against Zionist immigration. But their oppposition to Zionism was tempered by the latter's economic contribution. Haci Adil even stated, in January 1912, that "they were friends of Zionism, but opposed to immigration." Moreover, it is well known that the wartime policies of the German Ambassador Wangenheim and the U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau, who were both opposed to the expulsion of Zionists, were not rejected by the government. The leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress accepted a Jewish presence in Palestine stipulating, however, that the settlers become Ottoman subjects.

In this period, we are able to observe among Ottoman Jews a cautious attitude toward Zionism. Although, as Esther Benbassa has demonstrated, the Zionists encountered a groundswell of popular support within the community, their relations with its official representatives and spokesmen were uneasy and even hostile. For example, Judge Hammon, an Ottoman Jewish resident of Jerusalem, had been encouraged by Jacobson to become a candidate for parliamentary elections. Jacobson had considered him as someone who could represent the Zionists. On 11 November, 1912, he wrote about Hammon: "Although not a Zionist, he has an understanding of this matter; he is an honest and well-known young judge." Apparently, Hammon was one of those who believed that "silence is golden" and refused to cooperate. In Istanbul, the Zionist representatives were often in disagreement with the eminent Jewish deputies Emmanuel Carasso and Nissim Masliyah.

The one individual whom Jacobson and Lichtheim were most disappointed in, and whom they later came to detest, was Chief Rabbi Haim Nahum. Nahum is a historical figure who has been misrepresented in the literature on this subject. Just as Cavid, the minister of finance, Talat Pasha, the Unionist leader, and even Musa Kazim Efendi, the sheikhulislam, were sometimes depicted as Zionist sympathizers, so was Nahum included in this category. On 16 February, 1912, Lichtheim wrote concerning Nahum, "Our aim should be to overthrow Nahum and to keep the secular council." In reality, Nahum was a member of the Francophile and anti-German group in Istanbul, and he continued following this line after the Ottoman Empire entered the war as Germany's ally. On 14 December, 1914,Jacobson reported from Istanbul on a meeting between Nahum and Wangenheim at the German embassy. According to this report, Nahum had told the ambassador that while being Francophile he was not Germanophobe. When Lichtheim evaluated his own conversation with Nahum following this meeting, he commented that Nahum was not very fond of Zionists and added: "In his stupidity, he told me this himself, that he had somewhat slandered the Zionists on this occasion, because after all he hates us."

ILBER ORTAYLI...


Source:
The Jews of the Ottoman Empire. pp. 527-536.